Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka’s Proposition of the New Critique of Reason. Imagination–Creativity–Freedom

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Phenomenology is one of the main currents of modern philosophy. Philosophers most often understand it from the perspective of Edmund Husserl’s (1859–1938) phenomenology as a concept of cognition and a method of viewing and describing what is directly given, i.e. a phenomenon. In addition, phenomenology is the fundamental science – prima philosophia that determines what and how is directly given. Roman Ingarden (1893–1970), a student of E. Husserl, was the first thinker in Poland who practiced philosophy in a phenomenological way. R. Ingarden contributed to the dissemination of Husserl’s phenomenology in Poland and became an outstanding phenomenologist who developed an original phenomenological path proposing a creative reception of his teacher’s thoughts between World Wars II and I. Ingarden’s phenomenological path was different from Husserl’s. While Husserl developed a transcendental-idealistic form of phenomenology, Ingarden did not wholly abandon the transcendental path but went toward realism. The Polish phenomenologist did not want to question his master’s concept of the transcendental Self but only wanted to find a place for this Self in the real world.

Polish thinkers who further deepened the creative reception of Husserl’s phenomenology have always gathered around Ingarden. One such person was Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (1923–2014). Their professor-student meeting occurred at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow just after the end of World War II. Husserl’s phenomenology inspired A.-T. Tymieniecka, but this was phenomenology understood by Ingarden, taking into account the realism of the world and the entire sphere of empiricism. We can assume that the scholar’s meeting with Ingarden allowed Tymieniecka to develop her phenomenological concept, which she called the concept of the phenomenology of life and the human creative condition. It is a phenomenology that rejects idealism and chooses the realism of the world and life in the cosmic dimension. The human being here is a living entity whose life is anchored in nature but ultimately evolves and develops in culture through scientific and technological activities. In this cosmological and dynamically changing perspective, the source experience of the subject – a living being – becomes the experience of being alive and living in the unity-of-everything-there-is-alive. Therefore, Tymieniecka rejected the primordial nature of the cognitive-constitutive act of the pure consciousness, which we deal with in classical phenomenology, favouring a creative act founded in man’s creative imagination and only secondarily reflected in the cognitive act. The Polish philosopher believed that only in such a case is there a possibility of freedom in the human world of life and, thus – authentic self-realisation and self-interpretation of man in existence.

**Keywords:** phenomenology of life, creative imagination, logos of life, freedom, intuition of life
INTRODUCTION

The aim of this article is to concisely present the issues of human imagination and creativity and their connection with authentic human freedom in the world of living beings, which A.-T. Tymieniecka undertook in her concept of the phenomenology of life and the human creative condition (Tymieniecka 2004). The implementation of this goal will be based on a critical and descriptive analysis of the subject and object literature in the field of broad issues related to the phenomenology by Polish thinker. The background for these analyses will be the historical and philosophical context related to Tymieniecka's scholarly biography. This contemporary thinker considered the above issue as a part of the critique of reason, which she saw as highly urgent in today's dynamic scientific and technological development. In her opinion, the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries brought a global change in the form of a new era: the New Enlightenment (Tymieniecka 2011: 3–19; Tymieniecka 2006a: XI; Tymieniecka 2012: XXXIII–XXXIV). The encounter of philosophy (the phenomenology of life) with the natural sciences occurs on the level of human nature. In the discussed concept, man is understood as a human animal, where the term 'human', as an expression of spirituality, primarily indicates a man's ability to imagine something creatively and not necessarily to know it (Tymieniecka 2006).

Tymieniecka's philosophical stand on human imagination and creativity may be seen as an original and valuable proposition in philosophy to answer the question that we often hear today: 'What philosophy does a modern man need?' The above-mentioned question arises from a broader problem, expressed in another question: 'Does modern man need philosophy at all?'. We can assume that the very fact that this kind of concern moves us more and more often proves that we are experiencing a crisis of European culture, a crisis of the existing spiritual values, and, at the same time, a crisis of reason and philosophy itself. Nowadays, man is paradoxically disappointed with reason. Paradoxically, exact sciences currently offer such a research and cognitive horizon, which from their perspective, gives the impression of knowing the whole truth about the world and human nature. So what is disappointing and arouses a sense of disappointment? The discrepancy between expectations regarding the cognitive capabilities of reason and its efficiency in solving human problems at various levels of life: vital, intellectual-research, social and moral, and even sacral. The needs and the related expectations are enormous, and the solutions to them are meager. The feeling of crisis is more significant than the more clearly one notices that the problems faced by man today generate scientific and technological progress.

According to Tymieniecka, the modern world is determined by the influence of technology, which has enslaved man: human action and thinking. In this sense, modern man's perception of the world is unnatural, even 'impaired'. The technological transformation, whose author is man, has reached nature, the man himself, and the human world of culture as the world of symbols. Today the world is not understood as meaningful. Instead, we understand it as constantly shaping and becoming through human actions. It can be said that the whole world and man himself are gripped by violence, which, due to technological development, is becoming increasingly sophisticated and destructive. In the humanities, there is a fear that we will destroy the world to such an extent that we will have nothing to pass on to future generations (Marassi 2018: 74–75). Instead of giving humankind freedom, the thinking and acting of man today take it away.

Responsibility for correcting current affairs takes on philosophy, the source of all sciences. An elementary need is for a critical philosophy to lay the foundations for a vast edifice of
knowledge and to ground an entire culture. Therefore, the challenge posed to philosophy in the face of this crisis appears to be exceptionally difficult. Philosophy must manifest the logos of life. It must turn to life, nature, and the cosmos for this. As such, philosophy becomes the phenomenology of life, the task of which is to re-examine what makes it possible for a man to look at the world, to apprehend it, and what causes the world to exist before man's cognitive operations and not as a result of them (as Husserl claimed). The experience in which the inner spiritual world of man is cognitively self-given is shaped inside life: inside nature, culture and history. It is an experience of life. The nature, culture and history that build this experience are themselves influenced by science and technology. Tymieniecka described the current situation in European culture as ‘barbarism’ (Tymieniecka 2009: XXIII). This ‘barbarism’ manifests itself in the lack of an ethical and stable foundation of culture, the lack of a measure that would provide an unchanging point of reference for the moral assessment of today’s scientific and technological achievements, which are expanding into all areas of human life (Tymieniecka 2004: XI). Moreover, according to the thinker, the dynamic progress of science additionally intensifies the natural dynamism of reality – the world of life – which is present in man himself and his environment. As a result, the question about the meaning of human life and nature resounds with multiplied force today. Although the matter is grave, Tymieniecka did not succumb to the pessimistic mood resulting from the condition of contemporary European culture. She wrote: ‘Blinded and lost in the narrow circle of speculations, some philosophers have announced “the end of philosophy”. But the truth is that we are now at its rebirth’ (Tymieniecka 2004: XI). So, on the one hand, the human being will not escape and separate himself from these influences, but, on the other hand, he/she can use this fact for better understanding life – its source and development. That is why Tymieniecka wrote: ‘The natural sciences and human cultural creation are now profound enough to lay bare the foundations of our lives and beckon philosophy to enter the arena’ (Tymieniecka 2000: XXXI).

THE WAY TO THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF LIFE

A.-T. Tymieniecka began studying philosophy at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow (Poland) in 1945. She was very ambitious, completing the philosophy course in two years (1945–47) (Szymaniak 2011: 759). Then she went abroad to study philosophy further. She completed two doctorates in Fribourg, Switzerland, and the Sorbonne in Paris (Raynova 2015: 75) and obtained her postdoctoral degree at Saarland University in Germany. In the same year (1954), Tymieniecka permanently left for the United States to develop her activity on an international scale, related to the reception of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology (Szmyd 2004: 499). She did this by initiating a dialogue between phenomenology and all fields of science, with fine arts, literature, and even theology. For this purpose, she founded the World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning, operating since 1976 (Szymaniak 2011: 760). The scholar activity of the members of the Institute has been periodically published in Analecta Husserliana. The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research. This journal has been the publishing series whose founder was also Tymieniecka (since 1968) and whose first volume was published in 1971. Analecta Husserliana was to be a continuation of Husserl’s Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung.

However, Tymieniecka’s path (literally and figuratively) to freely deepen and spread her philosophical views was complex. The problem was not in emigration itself but in its reasons. The main one was undoubted of a philosophical and personal nature. She wanted to develop her concept of the phenomenology of life freely, only on her terms, which was difficult. Firstly,
she came from Eastern Europe, and secondly, she was a woman. Years later, she recalled those circumstances quite bitterly, as they determined her decision to leave Europe, which, as she claimed, she did ‘in tears’ (Raynova 2015: 75).

Tymieniecka undertook another struggle for creative freedom in the United States, successively working at several prestigious local universities. At that time, she met a group of recipients who had a positive attitude toward her concept of the phenomenology of life. They mainly understood the necessity of conducting a dialogue between phenomenology and particular sciences. However, we cannot say that she has not encountered any obstacles on her scholarly path since then. The biggest obstacle turned out to be the most prosaic – financial. In the United States, Tymieniecka noticed the problem of women being paid less than men working in similar positions. Those circumstances meant she could only partially implement her intentions of organising interdisciplinary and international congresses where representatives of various disciplines could meet to conduct phenomenological discourse (Raynova 2015: 77–78). This fact and the need for complete scholarly freedom and independence from any existing research centre influenced her decision to quit academic work. The thinker sought funding for her philosophical project: the phenomenology of life and the human creative condition. She succeeded, as evidenced by the World Phenomenology Institute.

The phenomenological research conducted by Tymieniecka did not intend to be purely theoretical considerations. At the beginning of her stay in the United States, she met Alfred Tarski (1901–1983) to discuss Husserl’s phenomenological work. For A. Tarski, it was clear that phenomenology is only a theoretical game without the possibility of applying it to solving real-world problems (Torjussen et al. 2008: 1–2). Tymieniecka, wanting to prove to him that phenomenology could pass a practical test, wrote a book entitled: Phenomenology and Science in Contemporary European Thought (Tymieniecka 1962). In it, she showed that phenomenology is present in science, art, literature, and in every field of human creativity. It is the foundation of culture, which is an excellent question about the ultimate meaning of human life. How various disciplines can formulate this question can be and is very different. Therefore, the answers are also different: different in literary language, different in the form of works of art, and still different in social or natural sciences theories. However, the essence of these questions is always the same. Therefore, phenomenology is not needed to be introduced into science, literature, or art. It is already there. However, not in the form in which Husserl perceived it.

Husserl was the one (but not only one) who raised the question of the crisis of European philosophy at the beginning of the 20th century. He connected the thought of its crisis with the problem of humanity itself. He also emphasised that Europe is not a geographical entity but a spiritual one. What happened in Polish philosophy thanks to the German phenomenologist resonated widely throughout Europe? This is best seen on the example of R. Ingarden’s phenomenology (Bęben, Ples-Bęben 2013: 7–11). He was Tymieniecka’s professor during her

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2 See: Die Krisis des europäischen Menschentums und die Philosophie by Edmund Husserl. This was the text of the lecture given by Husserl in 1935 at the invitation of the Vienna Cultural Association. The text was first published in 1954 in Husserliana VI, titled: Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie, 1935–1937.
studies at Jagiellonian University, and already at that time, she had outlined the framework of her phenomenological concept. Therefore, we can assume that her professor's teachings influenced Tymieniecka, but as she later emphasised, this influence was primarily polemical. Tymieniecka did not argue with Husserl (Torjussen et al. 2008: 5). She reviewed his phenomenology in an interdisciplinary way and adopted Husserl's idea of phenomenology as the science whose research reaches the deepest because of the very sources of logos, on which human life (and life as such) is founded (Tymieniecka 2009: 11). It was Husserl, she claimed, who taught her not to apply any external principle to experience, nothing that is not in the experience itself (Torjussen et al. 2008: 5). And so she did. Nevertheless, for Tymieniecka, it meant something else. She understood life, the experience of which is at issue here, differently from the way that the German phenomenologist understood it. Therefore, she indisputably rejected idealism and the concept of transcendental consciousness and transcendental intentionality. According to her, it does not correspond to the nature of the world and human life. It does not take into account the dynamics and changeability of reality. The reality, in transcendental idealism, is treated as an unchangeable structure that is what it is and can be known as it is (Tymieniecka 1972: 9). Tymieniecka also removed the method of epoché reduction from her phenomenological considerations. In general, she believed that accepting any method as the only correct one in any science is dogmatic and raises the question of ‘method of method’. Then science becomes inconclusive and requires justification in something outside, e.g. another science. However, phenomenology is supposed to be the justification for all sciences. Therefore, Tymieniecka did not refer to Husserl's phenomenological reduction or use the term ‘reduction’ in developing her concept.

Tymieniecka saw similar problems in Ingarden's ontology of possible beings. According to her, his ontology was another form of transcendental idealism (Szymd 2004: 502). Therefore, if, in Tymieniecka's opinion, neither the German nor the Polish phenomenologist managed to propose a concept of phenomenology that reaches the sources of human life and human nature (humanity), then they could not offer a reasonable possibility of its practical, de facto ethical, application in solving human existential problems.

By the way, Tymieniecka paid much attention to Ingarden's phenomenology. In 1952, she defended her doctoral dissertation, which analysed the problem of distinguishing between metaphysics and ontology in Ingarden's thought. Its subject was the following: Essence et existence. Étude à propos de la philosophie de Roman Ingarden et Nicolai Hartmann. This work, under the same title and in French, was published in Paris in 1957 (Tymieniecka 1957). It was Tymieniecka's first elaboration of Ingarden's philosophy and its interpretation of the need to go beyond the idealism-realism dispute, considering the research of natural sciences. In her opinion, Ingarden deeply dealt with the dispute between realism and idealism and showed the possibility of developing phenomenology in a realistic direction (Tymieniecka 1957: 97). This corresponded to Tymieniecka's understanding of critical thinking (Tymieniecka 2012: 41). And contemporary culture needs a new critique because it is entering a new era – the New Enlightenment (Tymieniecka 2011: XI–XII). It also needs a new metaphysical vision of man, the world and life.

Ingarden's realism was to open the way for phenomenology to such a vision. His analysis showed that phenomenology not only does not require moving aside the world's existence, removing empiricism from the field of phenomenological considerations, but it needs empiricism to undertake the epistemological task of understanding the sources and foundations of the world and life. However, Ingarden, according to his student, did not build metaphysics.
He built an ontology but did not show the internal unity of the whole reality, of which human life is an element. Thus, he failed to overcome idealism, and, it seems, he did not even strive to do so. Tymieniecka wrote: ‘Referring to both of them [Husserl and Ingarden – M. M.], my attempt to go beyond the limitations of the transcendental constitution on the one hand, and the purely ideal-structural apriorism on the other, is: 1) a new approach to the world, not as a subject area in structural-eidetic understanding, but of an individual object in the context of a process-understood world, 2) a reference to ideal structures, but a) a modified notion of ideas and b) a transition from the tautology of intentional analysis to inference based on it’ (Tymieniecka 1987: 71). Tymieniecka marked out the third, after Husserl and Ingarden, way of developing phenomenological research. It became the phenomenology of life and the human creative condition, which she called the ontopoiesis of life.

EVOLUTION: FROM PRIMORDIAL SPONTANEITY TO SELF-CONSCIOUS FEEDOM

The New Enlightenment was the time that brought dynamically growing science to humanity. Although, as was noted earlier, this fact raises much embarrassment, it does not mean that scientific achievements should not be significant for fundamental, phenomenological considerations. On the contrary, while phenomenology (philosophy in general) should not blindly follow the voice of natural science, it should not ignore it (as Husserl did). That is why Tymieniecka’s metaphysical vision assumes natural sources of the world and life, including human life. Man is a living being living within the unity-of-everything-there-is-alive (Tymieniecka 2006: XIII–XIV). The fact mentioned above must be considered in phenomenological analyses aimed at understanding the meaning of life. As we already know, Tymieniecka rejected any specific method of cognition for phenomenological research. Therefore, the question arises about how the phenomenology of life would reach the sources of life, show them and allow us to understand them. The answer is intuition, but neither in Husserl’s nor Ingarden’s terms. It is, therefore, not intuition in a purely intellectual but in a creative sense. Intuition is a direct cognition whose task is not to capture the essence of things – a permanent and unchangeable construction – or the current state of affairs but to follow reality in its constant, dynamic and natural changeability. Intuition is a creative pursuit, so it is also the axis of a constructive understanding of life. This constructive understanding of life means here that each time when life is intuitively experienced by a person, a completely new, so far absent, element appears in his or her life. A creator of this element is a man experiencing life. Intuition is not merely a manifestation of cognition by transcendental and pure consciousness but a reality-constructing function of the consciousness of the living being (human being).

Tymieniecka claimed that the human condition is creative from its very sources. She presented quite an exciting vision of the evolutionary development of human life. She located the source of life in the generative matrix (the womb of life), which was a kind of reservoir of all forces, energy, dynamism, virtuality, and laws governing the evolutionary development of nature from the prebiotic state, through the simplest microorganisms, plants and animals, to the human species (Tymieniecka 2009: 36, 39–40). This reservoir was activated by the original, spontaneous, internal, but above all, intentional impulse directing evolution to the development of life. Life means consciousness here. A spontaneous, primordial impulse initiated the creative imagination (imaginatio creatrix) and logos of life – two cosmic, metaphysical powers of creating life (Tymieniecka 2006: XIV–XV). Tymieniecka did not even try to explain where spontaneous intentionality came from, but she firmly distanced herself from any vitalism (Torjussen 2008: 5).
The beginnings of life are vital, but its further development goes towards achieving an increasingly higher degree of consciousness, up to the self-awareness of man at the intellectual, socio-moral and sacral levels. The evolution of life is progress because it directs its development towards greater and greater freedom, understood as the independence of the human spirit from the conditions of nature. Imagination drives evolutionary development with its unlimited ability to create, together with the logos of life, which directs it to progress, reaching the following levels of life development (consciousness). In the human condition, the evolution of life achieves self-awareness. Then the logos of life and creative imagination cede their creative powers to the human mind (Tymieniecka 2006a: XIII). From that moment, the vital forces weaken, and human aspirations are directed toward spiritual, culture-creating activities. The final level of life evolution is man's conscious striving towards Transcendence, God and salvation. By the way, the reference to Christian thought seems clear here, which would require a separate analysis. In any case, approaching Transcendence, God is also approaching the Fullness of the Logos. Moreover, this is the measure – the most appropriate for human being point of reference for all ways of thinking and acting toward oneself, towards other people and the world (Tymieniecka 2009: 231–242, 250). This measure is what man has always needed when relating to his intellectual, artistic, social, moral and sacred activities. In the Fullness of Logos, there is a measure for all of them. Moreover, it is a cosmic measure that applies to the life of the entire universe, not just human life.

IMAGINATION AND CREATIVE ACT AS A SOURCE OF FREEDOM

Considering the above scheme of human nature, which is the subject of phenomenological experience, and the very idea of the phenomenology of life, Tymieniecka was looking for the ‘Archimedean point’. This point is the moment in human life when human experiences his or her existence in its fullness, i.e. in its dynamic changeability and evolutionary progress towards Divinity and the Fullness of Logos (Tymieniecka 2004: XII). The thinker found it in the human creative act. She understood it as a kind of ‘window’ to human spirituality. It is a spirituality rooted in nature and, to some extent, submits to its laws over which man has no influence. However, it is also the spirituality of a living being, an animal that is unique because of its creative nature. Thanks to this nature, a human can free himself/herself from the power of nature and strive for absolute freedom (Tymieniecka 1987: 77).

So where do we find the creative acts of man? Wherever the human mind and consciousness come to the fore. The creative act is not only working of art, literature and poetry but also science in every field and discipline. It is philosophy and theology. The creative act is the whole human world of culture. It is a highly diverse human way of experiencing – experiencing the specificity of life, its meaning and destiny. The creative act is also an intuitive act of self-interpretation of man in existence. Only phenomenology founded in the self-interpretation of man in existence can function as prima philosophia – mathesis universalis (Tymieniecka 2000: 346). The creative act is an expression of man's self-interpretation in existence through the most primal and, in this sense, the source experience, which is the experience of being alive and living within the unity-of-everything-there-is-alive. The creative act is an explanation of the same intuition of life. It is a cognitive tool of our mind, which must follow the changeability of life, somehow identify with it, and identify with its object, life. In light of the research conducted by Tymieniecka, the mind is not only the intellect, and indeed – not pure like pure consciousness, but above all, imagination. The creative act is present ‘entirely’ in the experience of life. That is why she wrote: 'Life intuition, which I have isolated from
the creative process peculiar to the human being, shows itself adept at penetrating and giving due place to all other methods and approaches to the real, at appreciating all the peculiarities of their findings whether connected or seemingly disconnected. In short, we will follow along the spontaneous run of life’s intuition in pursuit of the meanders and relevance of all-there-is-alive, seeking ultimately the differentiating as well as unifying articulations of life’s origination and becoming at the cross section of various perspectives’ (Tymieniecka 2000: 220).

What the point of view proposed by Tymieniecka’s philosophy changes in phenomenology in general? First of all, the concept of the subject changes, and the way the subject is knowing about the world and life is deprived of authoritarianism and now follows the imagination. Imagination defines the horizon of experience, which, thanks to it, one constantly advances. The mind enters the ‘terrain’ that the imagination has spread out before it. Reason alone does not constitute this ‘terrain’.

CONCLUSIONS

According to A.-T. Tymieniecka, noticing the necessary participation of imagination in the new critique of reason would lead the humanity of the New Enlightenment era out of the uncertain searches characteristic of philosophy in the past (Tymieniecka 2011: 6–13). The presence of imagination in the critique of reason is adequate to the fact that man is a body-psychic-spiritual whole, and he is not only the spirit (reason) or the body (and its psyche). This way of thinking is supposed to be the only guarantor of a full self-interpretation of man in existence and the possibility of the phenomenology of phenomenology as an ontopoiesis of life.

The concept of the phenomenology of life and the human creative condition certainly fits into the canon of critical theories for the development of phenomenology. One can agree with Tymieniecka that she introduces the entire phenomenological trend into the third development phase: after Husserl and Ingarden. This concept fulfills the task that philosophy set itself at the beginning of its history – the cultivation of critical thinking. It is because critical thinking cannot be reduced to the functions of reason alone. Critical thinking extends to the imagination and the will, which are not subordinated to intellect, but are just as important as the function of the mind capable of creating and knowing, not only knowing what is already constituted.

Tymieniecka’s concept fits perfectly into contemporary man’s intellectual and spiritual moods and even grows out of these moods. It is about postmodern theories that ask about the possibility of talking about human nature from the perspective of the dynamics of changes taking place in the world under the influence of scientific, technological and medical development. These are changes made by man thanks to these sciences, but also changes in the natural world itself, down to its elementary particles, the occurrence of which we know thanks to scientific research carried out in these disciplines. The concept of the phenomenology of life and the human creative condition is a vision of reality that shows the possibility of man’s unity with the world: with nature, the cosmos and God while giving the human being autonomy and individuality of thinking and acting. This vision is an essential point of view today, when European culture, again in its history, is struggling with a problem called its crisis. The questions that arise in connection with today’s situation in which European culture finds itself are ultimately questions about human subjectivity and how humanity, which is the source and foundation of culture and social life, should be understood. These are de facto ethical questions to which the phenomenology of Tymieniecka can inspire those seeking answers. It
gives the possibility of cross-cultural, supra-religious and supra-political reflection. It seems that the thought emerging from this phenomenological concept about the unity of the whole world of life and freedom on the horizon of this unit has the potential to combine what is irreconcilable in common opinion: determinism with nondeterminism, realism with idealism, rationalism with empiricism, faith with science, life with death, reason with imagination, nature with spirituality, an empirical man with God, femininity with masculinity, and others. According to this concept, there is no impassable border between these elements. This idea means that interdisciplinary, intercultural dialogue, dialogue between different religions (not only ecumenism) and dialogue above political divisions become possible – dialogue, not just discussion. This dialogue is possible because every phenomenon of human life is founded on the creative act of man, thanks to which man's thinking is not closed within the limits of some predetermined categories or subjected to strictly defined rigours that narrow the horizon of human understanding. On the contrary, imagination opens this horizon to constantly new perspectives, possibilities and virtualities, and all existing ‘rigors’ and ‘categories’ of thinking take the form of ‘open systems’. This kind of thinking leads to the phenomenon of love, the manifestation of which is simply living in its obviousness and mystery simultaneously. In Tymieniecka’s deliberations, love ultimately reveals itself as a factor that justifies life: its creation, development, transformations and annihilation. All of this can be seen perfectly in the creative act of man, especially in the one that culminates in a work of art. Ch. McNeill-Matteson writes: ‘Professor Tymieniecka’s voice delicately opened the eyes of the world and changed it with the ultimate force, which calls her from the beginning of our existence, love within universal time and the cosmos: the logos of life’ (McNeill-Matterson 2019: 126).

Taking all this into account, however, one must maintain sight of the fact that this concept leaves at least one problem unsolved: the problem of human identity. The problem of the basis of this identity must arise where the existence of a predetermined, unchanging essence of every object is rejected and replaced by the view assuming the total changeability of all the elements of the world in their external and internal structure. Moreover, in the case of the phenomenology of life, we must think about how we can understand life and human nature from the dynamically variable perspective. The only constant factor here is changeability. So where is the source and foundation of human identity? We should find the answer to this question, as one may think, in the creative act of man.

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References
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Annos-Teresos Tymienieckos naujosios proto kritikos sprendinys: vaizduotė, kūrybingumas, laisvė

Santrauka


Raktažodžiai: gyvenimo fenomenologija, kūrybinė vaizduotė, gyvenimo logos, laisvė, gyvenimo intuicija