FILOSOFIJA. SOCIOLOGIJA
2026. T. 37. Nr. 1, p. 43–50

ISSN 0235-7186 eISSN 2424-4546
DOI: https://doi.org/10.6001/fil-soc.2026.37.1.5

Reflections of Violence: The Mirror Trope and Identity in Fiction Film

JUAN CARLOS CARRILLO
Universidad Panamericana, Mexico City, Mexico
Email: jccarrillo@up.edu.mx

GUSTAVO ECHEVARRÍA-NAVARRO
Tecnológico de Monterrey, Monterrey, Mexico
Email: gustavo.en@gmail.com

This article examines the representation of violence in the fiction film as a means of engaging with identity and meaning through cathartic experiences. It argues that while real-world violence often lacks inherent purpose, cinematic violence acquires significance within a narrative framework that enables viewers to process complex emotions. Using the mirror trope, and with necessarily brief examples, the study suggests that films not only reflect societal and individual struggles but also actively shape viewers' understanding of themselves and their ethical beliefs. By connecting Aristotle's concept of catharsis to contemporary theories of cinematic representation, the article reveals how cinema can transform discomforting portrayals of violence into opportunities for ethical and emotional reflection. The discussion highlights cinema's dual role as both an art form and a critical space for exploring moral issues, inviting further research on the impact of on-screen violence across diverse cultural and demographic contexts.

Keywords: film violence, mirror trope, identity construction, emotional catharsis, ethical reflection, film and morality

INTRODUCTION

Philosophy has long attempted to address questions about identity, as well as the meaning of life and its inexplicable aspects, such as evil or violence. Art in general, and cinema in particular, can give meaning to reality through fiction, also becoming a mirror that reflects, represents and shapes our identity. The representation of violence in film provides a powerful means (Sobchack 1976: 83; Lawtoo 2019: 138) for processing and understanding violence in the real world. While violence in everyday life is generally experienced as devoid of purpose, in cinematic narrative, it gains meaning by being integrated into a context that facilitates catharsis, as Aristotle postulated in the *Poetics* regarding the function of representations (*mimesis*).

This study is situated within the philosophy of film, aesthetics and ethics, examining how cinematic violence functions as a mirror for identity construction and moral reflection. Methodologically, it employs a hermeneutic approach to interpret the symbolic and narrative

structures of films, alongside psychoanalytic critique to explore how cinema constructs subjectivity through misrecognition. In the core of our argument, an Aristotelian perspective on catharsis provides a classical foundation for understanding how audiences emotionally and ethically process represented violence. A phenomenological perspective further considers the spectator's immersive engagement with cinematic violence, while theoretical frameworks in film studies offer insight into the aesthetic and ideological dimensions of representation. By synthesising these approaches, this article demonstrates how the mirror trope and catharsis enable viewers to process violence as both an artistic and ethical experience.

The article explores how film represents violence, sometimes with the ability to construct identities and provide meaning to the story and the cinematic experience by allowing or provoking emotional catharsis. Violence in film is understood as the representation of acts of physical or psychological aggression in a narrative context, presented to elicit an emotional response from the viewer; it can be stylised or presented graphically, and its impact depends on factors such as genre, narrative intent, and aesthetic contextualisation. These representations not only heighten dramatic tension but can also facilitate emotional catharsis in the audience (Lawtoo 2019). By analysing how cinema acts as a reflection and a means of processing violence, we aim to illuminate its fundamental role in understanding and constructing personal and collective meaning.

THE TROPE OF FILM AS MIRROR

In cinema, a trope can be understood as a rhetorical figure or stylistic device used to convey deeper meanings, evoke emotions, or highlight recurring themes and motifs within a work (Maurin 2002). Tropes in cinema are constructed from recognizable and familiar elements, enriching the cinematic experience and serving to connect the audience with the narrated story. Through tropes, filmmakers can explore complex and universal themes, facilitating a deeper and more emotional understanding of the story and its characters.

In the analysis of identity in cultural elements, it is observed how these reflect the conception of identity and develop a philosophical worldview. One of the most extensively discussed topics, in both film theory and philosophy, is that cinema, like other forms of cultural expression, can act as a *mirror* that reflects and shapes our understanding of ourselves and the world around us. Moreover, through its visual and auditory resources, cinema immerses the viewer in a multisensory experience.

Key figures in psychoanalytic film theory argued that cinema operates as an ideological apparatus similar to Jacques Lacan's (1949) *mirror stage*. For Jean-Louis Baudry (1970), the movie screen functions like a mirror, positioning the spectator as the subject of an illusory, unified vision. Christian Metz (1981) extends this idea, suggesting that spectators unconsciously identify with the cinematic apparatus itself, not just characters. This identification process is a form of *primary cinematic identification*, where the viewer's perception is structured by the camera's gaze, much like an infant's recognition of its reflection in Lacan's *stade du miroir*. Thus, the 'mirror' in cinema is not only a metaphor for self-reflection but also a mechanism that constructs subjectivity and meaning within the viewer.

Unlike Metz and Baudry's ideological perspective, André Bazin (1945) sees cinema as a 'window to the world' rather than an ideological construct. His realist film theory argues that film, through a deep focus and long takes, captures reality in an ontological sense. For Bazin, cinema is a mirror that reflects the world as it *is*, rather than manipulating it through montage or ideological framing.

This perspective complicates the mirror trope: if cinema acts as a direct reflection of reality (as Bazin suggests), then how does it shape identity and meaning? The answer lies in the tension between Bazin's *ontological mirror* and the psychoanalytic *misrecognition* proposed by Baudry and Metz. Cinema is both a reflection and a construction – offering viewers an image of the world that is mediated yet deeply immersive.

Gilles Deleuze (1986, 1989) disrupts the psychoanalytic and realist views by proposing that cinema operates as a *time-image* rather than merely a representation of reality. He argues that classical Hollywood cinema, dominated by action-driven *movement-images*, gives way in modernist cinema to *time-images*, where narrative causality is fractured. In this framework, the mirror trope shifts from a reflection of identity to a site of disorientation. Films like *Persona* (Bergman 1966) or *Mulholland Drive* (Lynch 2001) use mirrors not as stable reflections but as distortions, destabilising the viewer's sense of self and time. Here, identity in film is not merely constructed but actively deconstructed through temporal and spatial disjunctions.

Laura Mulvey's seminal work *Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema* (1975) introduces the concept of the *male gaze*, arguing that classical Hollywood cinema structures the viewer's perspective through a masculine, voyeuristic lens. In this sense, the mirror in cinema is not neutral – it is gendered and ideological. She draws on Lacan's *mirror stage* to argue that female characters in film are often positioned as objects of desire, reinforcing patriarchal power structures. Mirrors frequently appear in films to emphasise this dynamic – consider the famous mirror scenes in *Vertigo* (Hitchcock 1958) or *Black Swan* (Aronofsky 2010), where the act of looking becomes a site of both identity formation and fragmentation.

In the trope of cinema as a mirror, introspection and personal reflection are amplified by total immersion in the cinematic experience (Mockutė-Cicėnė, Žilinskaitė-Vytė 2023), thus serving as an analytical tool that enriches the viewer's ethical experience and reflection. The simile suggests that cinema not only reflects external reality but also offers an image in which we see ourselves, prompting a deep introspection directed toward personal identity and morality.

By employing the mirror trope from a perspective of decoding and interpretation, a deeper understanding of the films is developed, potentially finding greater relevance for one's own life. This approach promotes a dimension of cinema that is both theoretical and practical, as ethical experience in the cinema unfolds through a situated, emotionally engaged, aesthetically receptive response to images (Sinnerbrink 2016: 20).

As a recent example, in *Joker* (Phillips 2019), the close-ups of Arthur Fleck, played by Joaquin Phoenix, capture his transformation from a marginalised man to an icon of turmoil, and also reflect the 'hidden face' of a society that prefers to ignore those who do not conform to neurotypical, capitalist, heteronormative, Eurocentric and hegemonic criteria. Each close-up of Phoenix is an invitation not only to look at Arthur but also through him, at a society that continuously creates its own monsters. This use of the close-up turns the film into a mirror that reflects both personal introspection and the flaws and vices of society.

Similarly, in *Manchester by the Sea* (Lonergan 2016), the close-ups immerse viewers in the internal world of Lee Chandler, played by Casey Affleck. The emotions captured at the beginning of the film only generate discomfort and confusion, as a pain is experienced that has no clear explanation; later, after the revelation of the tragic domestic accident in the past, the same shots convey emotions that reflect loss and pain, resonating with the audience. Lonergan uses these close-ups to portray raw emotion, allowing the film to act as a mirror that reflects our own experiences with grief and redemption.

The trope not only enriches our understanding of cinema as an artistic medium but also reveals its ability to reflect and shape our experiences and identities. The use of similes in cinematic theory and practice provides a powerful perspective for examining and understanding the complexities of real life, such as violence, which also shape the development of one's identity.

The concept of identity, in the context of film, has also been explored as a dynamic and multifaceted construct. Giddens (1991) describes identity as self-understood reflexively by the individual in terms of their biography and in relation to the institutional figures that frame their personal history. This conception underscores the importance of self-reflection in the development of one's identity, a process that cinema can catalyse by presenting characters and situations, such as violence, with which viewers can identify or experience vicariously.

THE MEANING OF VIOLENCE IN FILM

The representation of violence can have different effects within the dramatic articulation of the film narrative, depending on various narrative, aesthetic and poetic parameters. There are different ways to represent violence, and these can contribute to or detract from the viewer's perception of meaning in that violence. This is because these modes of representation and their various consequences are related to catharsis within the narrative itself. Thus, this violence can be cathartic and, therefore, positive in a poetic sense.

Violence, when depicted with specific characteristics in a narrative, can acquire meaning, unlike its often chaotic and senseless nature in reality. In plots that depict sordid and violent situations, the outcomes can unfold positively, for example, with an opening toward hope and redemption, whether for the characters or solely in the experience of the viewer who undergoes emotional catharsis.

The quest to find a positive reason for violence and evil through fiction responds to a human inclination to give meaning to the suffering encountered in life. As Dekker (2014) points out from the field of psychology and 'safety science', accidents are studied not only for epistemological purposes (to understand how and why they occurred) or preventive reasons but also for moral (to clarify whether there was human fault) and existential purposes. The latter responds to the human need to find meaning in suffering (Dekker 2014: 1).

The study of violence in cinema is necessarily modern when addressing a contemporary medium like film that has constantly shown violence on-screen throughout its history and all around the world (Batalina, Kostiuk 2022). However, it is relevant to incorporate Aristotle's approach to represented fiction. The starting point for analysing violence from this aspect is that Aristotle notes in his *Poetics* that humans enjoy works of imitation (*mimesis praxeos*). He specifies that 'we enjoy contemplating the most precise images of things whose actual sight is painful to us, such as the forms of the vilest animals and of corpses' (Aristotle 1995: 37). While real violence is avoided as negative for humans, represented violence has an appeal for many people; as Aristotle himself acknowledges when speaking of suffering as part of the story, the *mythos*, and defining it as 'a destructive or painful action, such as public deaths, physical agony, woundings, etc.' (Aristotle 1995: 67). From this classical perspective, the representation of violence in cinema and the consequent generation of emotional satisfaction from its dramatic articulation can be conceived anew in light of Aristotle's concept of catharsis, that he presents as the main goal of the tragedy, that is, fictional representations:

> *Tragedy, then, is mimesis of an action which is elevated, complete, and of magnitude; in language embellished by distinct forms in its sections; employing the mode of enactment, not narrative; and through pity and fear accomplishing the catharsis of such emotion* (Aristotle 1995: 47).

If violence in representation contributes to accomplish catharsis, it would be a meaningful violence within that representation. Therefore, the meaning of represented violence is decisive, as it defines its function within the film. It involves 'issues objectively related to values, truths, and ideals' (García-Noblejas 1996: 23). This notion of meaning arises from assimilating the plot as a whole, which García-Noblejas and Brenes explain as the 'second navigation' the viewer undertakes when evaluating the dramatic work in its entirety after its conclusion (Brenes 2016: 177). Thus, while violent content – implicit or explicit, and of varying degrees – may be present, once the film ends and the resolution of the plot and the images are known, it becomes evident to what extent the violence contributed to the film's overall meaning.

By saying this, we establish that fiction, with its own rules, can contribute to giving meaning to violence, which in the real world lacks it. As Walter Benjamin (2021) pointed out, there is a *mythical violence* that rebels against controlling *legal violence*, while also hinting at a *divine violence* that surpasses it but remains unattainable. It is suggestive that, within the realm of fiction, this divine violence can exist, as this space allows for poetic justice – which can be achieved through violence – when, in reality, such justice often does not exist.

Thus, the primary distinction to consider is between real violence and represented violence. Real violence, in all its forms and manifestations, including those Žižek (2008) calls subjective – attributable to specific individuals – and those that are objective or systemic, is never acceptable, as even those that pursue a just end, as Arendt notes, originate a more violent world (Arendt 1970: 44). Represented violence, however, does not directly impact reality[1] but operates within the viewer's understanding and emotions. Beyond the issue of audience reception from a psychological standpoint[2], our interest lies in understanding the relationship between representation and what it represents and, most importantly, in the rhetorical construction of fictions and the poetic nature of represented violence. This involves a shift from political philosophy to the realm of representation, thus to poetics and rhetoric, and finally back to ethics through the human actions depicted in fiction.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING REAL AND REPRESENTED VIOLENCE

Addressing violence in representation, as opposed to real violence, requires navigating an epistemological challenge: that of representation and its validity. To what extent can a representation tell us something true about reality? This is particularly significant in cinema, where what is presented on screen is offered as the entirety of the reality to be known, considering what Bentley states in *The Life of the Drama* (1964), that fiction is coherent and truth is not necessarily, in that 'truth is stranger than fiction, for the latter possesses a coherence that the former lacks' (1982: 47). As Cavell warns:

---

[1] Excluding cases of physiological effects resulting from exposure to this specific content on screens; see, for example, Sigman 2007 and Zillmann 1991.

[2] Although this is not the method used in this article, there are certainly many studies that address this through empirical methodologies based on the viewer. For example, Knobloch-Westerwick et al. (2013) discuss in an empirical study with viewers of 'tragic' audiovisual content how 'feeling bad in fiction leads to feeling good in real life.'

> *Film turns our epistemological conviction inside out: reality is known before its appearances are known. The epistemological mystery is whether and how you can predict the existence of the one from the knowledge of the other. The photographic mystery is that you can know both the appearance and the reality, but that nevertheless the one is unpredictable from the other* (Cavell 1979: 185–186).

An internal depiction or representation can also derive from – or exist in – a representation that, in turn, exists in reality, as is the case with fiction. Thus, Aristotle in the *Poetics* defines tragedy as *mimesis praxeos* (1995: 46), 'imitation of actions,' so that two realities exist: representation as such, that is, fiction in any of its forms, and the reality it represents, and between the two, there is a relationship (Gutiérrez Delgado 2018: 294). When studying fiction, it is essential to emphasise how these two realities coexist: 'the *mythos* needs the real to be understood, and the real resorts to the *mythos* for understanding and finding meaning' (Gutiérrez Delgado 2018: 298).

This coexistence of the real and the represented presents certain paradoxes. It is evident in the case of violence: we reject real violence, at least when it is directed against us or we witness it, but we are attracted to – or can be attracted to – represented violence. Young (2009) specifically studies the representation of crime scenes (in what she calls *crime-image*, alluding to Deleuze's terminology of *movement-image* and *time-image*) considering the affects that cinema generates in the viewer. She questions the paradox of how something with a negative conception, like crime, can be so attractive to watch in fiction. She concludes that scenes of violence in much contemporary cinema provide pleasure – but not peace – to the viewer partly because they occur within a narrative that promises the violence will be judged, punished and prevented. That is, a punitive response is counterposed, or the violence is represented within a framework designed to provoke condemnation or provide a sense of legitimacy that alleviates the anxiety of observing the crime scene, though she also notes that violence is not always presented in this way (Young 2009: 160).

Conclusions like Young's suggest that, while real violence can never be justified, represented violence can give it meaning, in that 'the development of a narrative implies the presence of an instance that proceeds to structure chaos into a form of cosmos' (García-Noblejas 1996: 131).

Now, this possibility will depend on how the representation is given in formal terms – for example, whether it is ironic or not; or if it seeks to revel in the violence graphically – and on what role the violence plays within the plot as a whole, particularly whether it is resolved in the ending. This is related to the outcome of the tragedy, which is what Aristotle calls catharsis.

When approaching violence in film through the mirror metaphor, seeking in the story and the viewing experience those elements of one's own experience and context that we can see 'reflected' in it, cinema presents itself as a platform that allows for a deeper exploration of aspects of our identity and morality.

With close-up shots, a film represents more than the external appearance of characters; it also conveys their internal states and deep emotions. Filmmakers can capture and transmit the most subtle and complex emotions, allowing viewers to see and feel what the characters are experiencing. This process of identification and empathy can lead to a deeper understanding of human nature and our own emotions and experiences, especially those regarding violence.

CONCLUSIONS

Throughout this article, we have explored how violence in cinema functions not only as a narrative device but also as a mechanism for constructing identity and meaning through the provocation of emotional catharsis in the viewer. Through the mirror trope, we have analysed

how cinema reflects and shapes the emotions, social tensions, and experiences of the viewer, allowing them to see themselves reflected on the screen. Cinematic techniques, such as the use of tropes, specific framing, and manipulation of temporality, transform cinema into an emotional mirror where viewers can process violence and find meaning within their own reality.

Violence in cinema, presented through the mirror trope, offers viewers the opportunity to reflect on their own identity and their place in an often violent and unjust world. By allowing the viewer to identify with the characters and violent situations, cinema acts as a space where complex emotions, such as fear, anger, or despair, can be confronted and transformed cathartically. In this sense, cinema not only reflects the inherent tensions of violence but also acts as a catalyst for the construction of individual and collective identities.

By connecting the representation of violence in cinema with Aristotle's concept of catharsis, this article demonstrates how the mirror trope allows viewers not only to contemplate violence but also to process it in an ethical and emotional manner. This analysis opens the door to future research that explores how different audiences, in terms of age, gender, and cultural context, process violence in cinema. It would also be useful to conduct comparative studies on the representation of violence in other audiovisual media, such as television series or video games, and how these media may differ in their ability to provoke catharsis or shape identities. Finally, future research could delve into the long-term effects of exposure to represented violence on screen, particularly in vulnerable populations.

Cinema, as a mirror of our emotional and social reality, has a unique power to transform our understanding of violence and our identity. Through the mirror trope, viewers not only see their own experiences represented but also find a way to better understand themselves and the world around them. Ultimately, violence in cinema, when represented with intention and meaning, can be a means to explore our own internal struggles and find meaning in a world that often seems devoid of it.

Received 15 October 2024
Accepted 12 March 2025

References

1. Arendt, H. 1970. *On Violence*. New York, San Diego and London: Harcourt Brace and Company.
2. Aristotle. 1995. *Poetics*. Translated by S. Halliwell, W. Hamilton Fyfe, D. Innes and W. Rhys Roberts. Revised by D. A. Russell. Loeb Classical Library 199. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
3. Batalina, Kh.; Kostiuk, N. 2022. 'Violence in the Context of World Cinema History', *Bulletin of Kyiv National University of Culture and Arts. Series in Audiovisual Art and Production* 5(1): 54–63.
4. Baudry, J.-L. 1970. 'Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus', *Film Quarterly* 28(2): 39–47.
5. Bazin, A. 2005 (1945). *What is Cinema*? Translated by H. Gray. Berkeley: University of California Press.
6. Benjamin, W. 2021 (1921). *Toward the Critique of Violence. A Critical Edition*. Redwood City: Stanford University Press.
7. Bentley, E. 1964. *The Life of the Drama*. New York: Atheneum.
8. Brenes, C. S. 2016. 'Explorando el tema. La noción poética de "sentido" al servicio de la escritura de guion', *Revista de comunicación* 15: 166–182.
9. Cavell, S. 1979. *The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
10. Dekker, S. W. 2014. 'The Psychology of Accident Investigation: Epistemological, Preventive, Moral and Existential Meaning-making', *Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science* 16(3): 202–213.
11. Deleuze, G. 1986. Cinema 1: *The Movement-Image*. Translated by H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam. London: The Athlone Press.
12. Deleuze, G. 1989. *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*. Translated by H. Tomlinson and R. Galeta. London: The Athlone Press.

13. García-Noblejas, J. J. 1996. *Comunicación y Mundos Posibles*. Pamplona: Eunsa.
14. Giddens, A. 1991. *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Stanford University Press.
15. Gutiérrez Delgado, R. 2018. 'El Concepto de Relación. Consideraciones Epistemológicas Sobre el Valor Cognoscitivo de la Ficción', *Revista de Comunicación* 17(2): 292–315. DOI: 10.26441/RC17.2-2018-A13
16. Knobloch-Westerwick, S.; Gong, Y.; Hagner, H.; Kerbeykian, L. 2013. 'Tragedy Viewers Count Their Blessings: Feeling Low on Fiction Leads to Feeling High on Life', *Communication Research* 40(6): 747–766.
17. Lacan, J. 1949. 'The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience', in *Écrits: A Selection* (translated by Alan Sheridan). New York: W. W. Norton, 1977: 1–7.
18. Lawtoo, N. 2019. 'The Double Meanings of Violence: Catharsis and Mimesis', in *Violence and Meaning*, eds. L. Lauwaert, L. K. Smith and C. Sternad. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 137–165. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-27173-2_7
19. Maurin, A. S. 2002. 'Tropes', in *If Tropes*, Synthese Library, Vol. 308. Cham: Springer. DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-0079-5_2
20. Metz, C. 1981. *The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the Cinema*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
21. Mockutė-Cicėnė, A.; Žilinskaitė-Vytė, J. 2023. 'Philosophy of Identity in Fashion Phenomenon: Codes, Structures, and Integrity', *Filosofija. Sociologija* 34(3): 280–289. DOI: https://doi.org/10.6001/fil-soc.2023.34.3.8
22. Mulvey, L. 1975. 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema', *Screen* 16(3): 6–18.
23. Sigman, A. 2007. 'Visual Voodoo: The Biological Impact of Watching TV', *Biologist* 54(1): 12–17.
24. Sinnerbrink, R. 2016. *Cinematic Ethics: Exploring Ethical Experience through Film*. Routledge.
25. Sobchack, V. 1976. 'The Violent Dance: A Personal Memoir of Death in the Movies', in *Graphic Violence on the Screen*, ed. T. Atkins. New York: Monarch Press, 79–94.
26. Young, A. 2009. *The Scene of Violence: Cinema, Crime, Affect*. London: Routledge-Cavendish. DOI: 10.4324/9780203880791
27. Zillmann, D. 1991. 'Television Viewing and Physiological Arousal', in *Responding to the Screen: Reception and Reaction Processe*s, eds. D. Zillmann and J. Bryant. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 103–133.
28. Žižek, S. 2008. *Violence: Six Sideways Reflections*. Picador.

JUAN CARLOS CARRILLO, GUSTAVO ECHEVARRÍA-NAVARRO

Smurto atspindžiai: veidrodžio tropas ir tapatybė pramanytame filme

Santrauka

Straipsnyje nagrinėjamas smurto vaizdavimas pramanytame filme kaip priemonė susieti tapatybę ir prasmę per katarsio patirtį. Teigiama, kad nors realiame pasaulyje smurtas dažnai neturi įgimtos prasmės, kinematografinis smurtas įgyja reikšmę pasakojimo sistemoje, leidžiančioje žiūrovams įveikti sudėtingas emocijas. Naudojant veidrodžio tropą ir būtinai trumpus pavyzdžius, tyrime parodoma, kad filmai ne tik atspindi visuomenės ir individų kovas, bet ir aktyviai formuoja žiūrovų supratimą apie save ir jų etinius įsitikinimus. Siedamas Aristotelio katarsio sampratą su šiuolaikinėmis kino vaizdavimo teorijomis, straipsnis atskleidžia, kaip kinas gali paversti nepatogius smurto vaizdavimus apmąstymais apie etiką ir emocijas. Diskusijoje pabrėžiamas dvigubas kino, kaip meno formos, ir kaip kritinės erdvės, nagrinėjančios moralines problemas, vaidmuo, kviečiant toliau tirti smurto ekrane poveikį įvairiuose kultūriniuose ir demografiniuose kontekstuose.

Reikšminiai žodžiai: smurtas filme, veidrodžio tropas, tapatybės kūrimas, emocinis katarsis, etikos apmąstymas, filmas ir moralė