Epistemic Responsibility, Gettier Analysis and its Influence in Feminist Philosophy

Abstract

The Idea of Epistemic Responsibility (ER) emerged in epistemology was initially a response to Gettier. Classical thinkers, in response to Gettier, offered different directions for epistemic justification and strengthened the notion of ER. This study examines the evolution of ER from its classical origins in responses to Gettier’s critique of the justified true belief (JTB) model to its feminist reformulation in Lorraine Code’s Epistemic Responsibility. It hypothesises that Code’s concept of ER offers a philosophically robust and ethically grounded resolution to the Gettier problem by shifting epistemic justification from the abstract cognition to the situated, morally engaged practice. Using an analytic and comparative method, the research juxtaposes classical epistemologists such as Sosa, Chisholm, Bonjour and Kornblith with feminist theorists, especially Code, to trace how moral accountability, situated knowledge and relational trust redefine justification. The findings reveal that feminist conceptions of ER transform epistemology from a formal, context-free model into an ethically responsive framework that views knowledge as a moral and relational achievement. ER reframes the Gettier-style epistemic failure as a lapse of moral and cognitive responsibility rather than a mere problem of epistemic luck. Integrating intellectual virtue with moral accountability, ER thus bridges classical and feminist epistemology, offering a holistic, context-sensitive model of knowing.